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Abstract: We study unemployment insurance 
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Introduction  
 
 Several studies have stressed that individual transitions out of unemployment 
depend on the extent to which recall by the previous employer is expected (Rosholm 
and Svarer, 2001; Jensen and Svarer, 2003; Røed and Nordberg, 2003). Despite this 
prior research and the fact that in Spain around a third of jobless workers return to the 
firm where they were previously employed (Alba et. al., 2007), research on 
unemployment duration in this country has traditionally given little attention to the 
outcome of return to the previous employer. Instead, prior research has mainly focused 
on the generosity of the unemployment compensation system and its impact on the exit 
out of unemployment (see, e.g., Alba-Ramírez, 1999; Bover et al., 2002; Gonzalo, 
2002; Jenkins and García-Serrano, 2004; Arranz and Muro, 2007; Arranz et al., 2009). 
Only recently has research in Spain distinguished spells that end in recall (i.e., workers 
returning to the previous employer) from those that end in exit to a new job (Alba et. al., 
2007, 2012). As these authors underlined, a better understanding of the recall 
behaviour by the unemployed is important for labour market policy and measures 
addressing joblessness. Specifically, distinguishing recall to the same employer from 
reemployment into a new job becomes useful to understand the influence of individual 
and job characteristics on the unemployment hazard rate. These authors found the 
length of time workers collect unemployment benefits to be significantly affected by 
firms’ recall decisions.  
Previous research distinguishing the two mentioned exits from unemployment 
(recall versus new job) was based on standard duration models. A standard duration 
model produces estimates of how variables affect the hazard, but requires (and 
assumes) the probability of recall for all cases to be one. That is, hazard models 
generally make distributional assumptions that effectively require all cases to 
eventually experience the hazard (i.e., be recalled). This would be no inconvenient 
provided that the event in question (the recall) was universal —i.e., that recalls were 
experienced by everyone in the population (Cox and Oakes, 1984). However, this 
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distributional assumption will not be met if the cases are heterogeneous, so that some 
cases have zero (or close to zero) recall probability. As commented above, because 
the majority of jobless workers are not recalled in Spain, we find it hard to accept the 
standard duration model’s assumption that every individual will eventually be recalled. 
Therefore, the motivation of this paper is to provide an empirical analysis on the 
determinants of the length of time until a recall occurs among a sample of 
unemployment benefit recipients, allowing for the possibility that some individuals will 
never be recalled. The relevance of our analysis also lies in the fact that duration in the 
unemployment benefit system in Spain is important for UI policy concerns. Specifically, 
if before searching more intensively for a new job as benefit exhaustion approach, 
benefit claimants attempt recall from their previous employer, this may imply that the 
Spanish UI benefit system (which is nearly fully subsidized, in the terminology of 
Feldstein) offers an implicit subsidy to firms that rely heavily on temporary layoffs and 
to workers interested in only part-year work. If this were the case, there would exist a 
tendency for individuals to fall into a trap of repeat use of the UI system. In this regard, 
we analyze whether there are a significant influence of firms’ recall policies as 
determinants of duration of workers’ unemployment benefit spells.  
For this purpose, we estimate two models based on two competing 
assumptions. The first model takes the standard assumption in duration models that all 
benefit recipients eventually end in a recall job. The second one is a split population 
duration model which takes into account the possibility that some benefit recipients will 
never be recalled to his/her previous employer. This way, we avoid conflating the 
speed and proportion of recalls, which is typical of standard unemployment duration 
models. Because split population models are designed to examine research problems 
where there is a proportion of long-term survivors —i.e., people who never experience 
the event (Maller and Zhou 1996)— our analysis allows us to measure the effects of 
our independent variables on whether a recall will occur, as well as their influence on 
when such event happens. We thus make an empirical contribution to the extant 
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literature that applies “cure models”, which have a history of extensive implementation 
in social sciences, where the assumption that all observations will eventually fail is 
often unrealistic. Cure models offer a more realistic alternative to modelling these data. 
This literature has had both a long history (e.g. Boag 1949; Berkson and Gage 1952) 
and widespread applications (e.g. Vaupel et. al. 1979; Farewell 1982; Aalen 1988, 
1992; Kuk and Chen 1992; Longini and Halloran 1996; Maller and Zhou 1996; 
Tsodikov 1998a, 1998b; Price 1999).  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the 
unemployment insurance benefits in Spain. Section 3 presents the dataset and 
provides some basic facts on recalls and unemployment benefits. Section 4 discusses 
the econometric models, distinguishing the traditional duration model from the split 
population duration model. Section 5 provides the estimation results. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are presented in section 6.  
 
Unemployment insurance benefits in Spain  
 
In Spain, individuals who have lost their job involuntarily—including the end of 
fixed-term contracts—and have worked for 12 months or more during the six years 
preceding unemployment are eligible for UI benefits. Individuals who have worked for 
12–17 months can receive UI for up to 4 months. Those who have worked for 18–23 
months can receive up to 6 months, and so on up to a maximum of 24 months of UI for 
those who have worked for 72 months or longer. The amount of UI is determined as a 
percentage of the average wage in the 12 months preceding unemployment: 70% 
during the first six months of unemployment and 60% for the remaining period of 
eligibility. The minimum amount is 75% of the statutory minimum wage (SMW) if the 
worker has no dependent children (100% if he has dependent children). There is also a 
maximum equal to 170% of the SMW, which is raised to 190% (220%) if the 
unemployed person has one (two or more) dependent child (children). 
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One key institutional difference between the UI systems in Spain and those in 
other countries is the absence of the no experience rating in the Spanish UI tax 
systemi. As a result, the unemployment benefit system contains a subsidy element that 
can lead to an extensive use of recalls. Since UI claimants expecting to be recalled 
have less of a tendency to search for a new job,ii individuals may repeatedly cycle 
between UI and employment with the same employer (Alba et al., 2012). For instance, 
some individuals might work for the minimum amount of time needed to qualify for 
benefits (1 year), collect benefits for as long as possible (up to 4 months), be recalled 
to the previous employer and, finally, repeat the cycle.  Thus, instead of searching for a 
new job, UI recipients may wait for a recall from their previous employer as of the time 
the benefit is exhausted. At the same time, employers may synchronize their recall 
decisions according to the unemployment benefit entitlement because laying off a 
worker with a high potential entitlement is less costly to the firm than laying off an 
equally productive worker with a low potential entitlement—the former will be less likely 
to find a new acceptable job with an alternative employer than the latter (Pissarides, 
1982).  
 
The dataset  
 
This paper uses the Spanish “Continuous Sample of Working Life” data set 
(Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, hereinafter MCVL). This administrative dataset 
contains information on all employment and insured unemployment spells of a 4 
percent random sample of Spanish individuals who had some relationship with the 
Social Security across the period 2004-2010. The MCVL dataset is made up of several 
files containing diverse information. The personal file includes information on individual 
characteristics (gender, age, province of residence and nationality). The Social Security 
files contain details on firm and job attributes (employer size, industry affiliation, 
qualification level, type of contract, tenure, and reason for termination of the spells). 
The MCVL dataset contains accurate and detailed information on the jobs held by the 
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individuals who entered insured unemployment. Moreover, the dataset contains an 
anonymous identification number for the employer associated with every single spell of 
employment. Thus, recalls are identified by whether or not each firm’s identification 
numbers of two subsequent employment spells coincide. This allows us to know 
whether job losers were immediately rehired by the same or a different employeriii. 
The MCVL also provides information on the unemployment benefits received by 
each worker (in the event they are eligible for them), the type of benefits received (UI or 
UA) and the number of days of benefit receiptiv. Nonetheless, in order to collect 
information on the wages received by the individuals included in our sample in the 
previous job and on their level of UI benefits, we have merged this dataset with a 
separated ‘tax module’ in the MCVL provided by the Tax Administration National 
Agency (Agencia Tributaria, AEAT), which gives annual data on different types of 
income receivedv. In particular, we have linked the wages and the level of UI benefits 
contained in the aforementioned tax module with the Personal and Social Security files 
because, as it is well known, tax earnings data do not suffer either from measurement 
errors (which are common in self-reported wages) or from top coding (also common in 
administrative data like Social Security records) —these two problems make tax data 
far more reliable. Another fact that reassures us in the use of tax data is that results are 
fully comparable to the ones obtained with other sources such as the Quarterly Labour 
Cost Survey (from the Spanish National Statistics Institute) —in the case of wages— 
and the labour statistics published by the Spanish Public Employment Service —in the 
case of the amount of unemployment benefits (see Arranz and García-Serrano, 
2011b)vi. 
In the present study, we use a subsample of the MCVL complete dataset. The 
selection consists of a representative sample of individuals whose employment spells 
ended at any time of the year 2005 and who complied with the following criteria: 1) 
Entered unemployment insurance (UI) due to involuntary reasons —i.e., the end of 
temporary contracts, layoffs and other involuntary reasons; 2) Were wage and salary 
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workers in the non-agriculture private economy (i.e., the individuals selected were 
registered in the General System of Social Security in the previous job); 4) Were 
between 16 and 59 years-old at the time of starting UI (to avoid complications 
associated with early retirement). 5) We have information of wages and amount benefit 
data contained in the tax module about recipients. After applying this sample selection, 
we obtain a final sample of 50,140 (1,253,500 weighted) spells of unemployment 
insurance after individuals have lost their job in 2005.  
[TABLE 1] 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the empirical 
analysis. In this table, censored observations correspond to individuals who exhaust UI 
benefits. Therefore, out of the total sample, 6,855 observations correspond to censored 
observations (13.67% of the entire sample). The values of all the variables are 
measured at the beginning of the UI spell. As Table 1 shows, 33.89% of unemployed 
who find a job return to the firm where they were previously employed. Therefore, 
recalls do constitute, indeed, an important element of unemployment in Spain (this 
figure is coherent with prior literature; see, e.g., Alba et al., 2007, 2012, or Arranz and 
García-Serrano, 2011a), and is even higher than the one found in other European 
countries (Mavromaras and Rudolph, 1998; Mavromaras and Orme, 2004). In addition, 
the recall outcome is concentrated on certain individuals. Women are particularly more 
likely than men to return to the previous employer (55.6 percent of recalled individuals 
are women). The recall outcome is also more prevalent among individuals above 30 
years-old, manual qualified workers (BCHS, BCMS and BCLS), workers with relatively 
short tenure in their previous job, those who held either a temporary or a permanent-
per-task contract, and those previously hired in firms with more than 250 employees in 
the business activities and financial intermediation, and in real estate and renting 
industries. 
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Methodology 
 
Econometric approach: split population model for the recall outcome 
 
As already stated above, one assumption of standard duration models is that 
every observation in the data will eventually experience the event of interest (in our 
case, a recall). Schmidt and White (1989) relaxed this assumption by essentially 
“splitting” the observations under analysis into two subpopulations: one that would 
eventually experience the event of interest and one that would never experience the 
event. In our analysis, we are interested in the factors that explain the timing of recalls 
after the individuals’ job loss in 2005. Because a standard duration model (SDM) 
cannot account for the fact that not all these unemployed individuals are recalled by 
their previous employer, in this section we describe the split population duration model 
(SPDM), which accounts for the possibility that some individuals will never be recalled. 
Specifically, following Schmidt and Witte (1989), we specify a model that generates two 
sets of simultaneously estimated coefficients: (1) coefficients for the effects of 
covariates on the incidence of the recall occurring, and (2) coefficients for the effects of 
covariates on the timing of the recall, conditional on the recall occurring. Therefore, the 
probability of eventual recall is an additional parameter to be estimated, and may be 
less than one. More formally, we define a latent variable F that is equal to one for 
cases that eventually end in recall and zero for cases that are not likely to end in recall; 
this variable is unobservable. Let: 
 
Pr(F=1)= δ (1) 
Pr(F=0)= 1- δ (2) 
  
Where δ is the rate at which unemployed individuals are recalled. When δ=1, all 
individuals would eventually be recalled, and the population will not be characterized by 
the unobserved split between recall and new job. Now, let Y be the observable variable 
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indicating whether individuals actually experience the recall hazard. For individuals that 
are eventually recalled, Y=1 (Y=0 for individuals not recalled).  
Next, assume a distribution function, G(t|F=1) with density g(t|F=1), both 
conditional on F=1 because the hazard is irrelevant where the probability of recall is 0. 
Thus, for individuals who are recalled, we observe Y=1, and so F=1, and the density is: 
Pr(Y=1)=Pr(F=1)g(t|F=1)= δ g(t|F=1) (3) 
Whereas for non-recalled individuals, Y=0, and F is unknown, so the probability 
of Y=0 is: 
Pr(Y=0)=1- δ+ δ [1-g(t|F=1)] (4) 
Therefore, the SPDM is applied to account for a specific type of heterogeneity, 
i.e. the possibility that some individuals will never experience a recall while others will. 
What we are estimating here is, first, the probability of being recalled and, second, the 
timing of this event conditional on the probability of being recalled. The probability of 
failure δ can be estimated via a probit or logit model, and thus can be specified as a 
function of a set of independent variablesvii. Thus, the model consists of two equations; 
the first one estimates Pr(recall), and the second estimates the hazard given the 
probability of recall and a set of independent variables —h(t|recall,x). The hazard in the 
SPDM is conditional on the probability of ever being recalled. Note that if δ=1, the 
SPDM reduces to the SDM (which presumes that all individuals are eventually 
recalled). 
The time-to-recall or hazard model can be estimated via any of the parametric 
or semi-parametric specifications commonly used in the literature. Thus, the general 
shape of the hazard function will be constrained by the functional form of the probability 
distribution G(t) imposed on the data. Given the potential negative stigma associated 
with unemployment (the time in unemployment may serve as a signal that the person 
has not received any offer), we expect the recall hazard to first rise rapidly, and then 
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decline over time. This intuition is borne out in figure 2 (see next section), which shows 
the Kaplan Meier recall hazard rate for the whole sample. The largest number of recalls 
occurs in the first year after the individual became unemployed. For this reason, we 
use the log-logistic distribution in our tests, a relatively flexible form that yields a hazard 
function that is non-monotonic in t. This flexibility is essential to test whether the recall 
failure follows a non-monotonic, life cycle type pattern (as suggested in figure 2). The 
log-logistic duration model assumes that ln(t) has a logistic distribution with mean 0 and 
variance πγ/√3 (Greene, 1997, p. 989). This yields the following functional forms of the 
survival and hazard functions: 
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where the estimable parameters p and λ give the hazard function its exact shape. The 
parameter p (known as the scaling parameter) determines the rate at which the hazard 
rate increases or decreases across time: if p<1, the log-logistic hazard increases and 
then decreases. If p≥1, then the hazard is monotone decreasingviii. The parameter λ 
determines the portion of the hazard rate that is time-invariant. We estimate these 
parameters using maximum likelihood techniques and the following likelihood function: 
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where Qi = 1 if individual i is recalled during the sample period (for uncensored 
observations); Qi = 0 if individual i survived the sample period or is not recalled during 
the sample period (for censored observations). The split parameter δ is the estimated 
mean probability of individuals experiencing the event of interest. Thus, the model 
collapses to a standard duration model for δ=1, in which S(t) and g(t) are estimated 
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assuming that all individuals are eventually recalled; while for δ <1 both S(t) and g(t) 
are estimated conditional on the probability of failure. 
Of the three estimable parameters in the likelihood function (δ, λ, and p), the 
probability of recall δ and the cross-sectional parameter λ can be made individual-
specific as follows: 
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where Xi is a vector of individual-specific and time-invariant covariates, and the 
parameter vectors αand βare to be estimatedix. The estimated α‘s measure the 
impact of the covariates on the probability that an individual will survive —a negative 
αindicates that the covariate is associated with a lower probability of survival (a 
higher probability of recall). The estimated β‘s measure the impact of the covariates on 
the individuals’ unemployment duration until a recall is observed —given that a recall 
occurs, a negative βcoefficient indicates that the covariate is associated with a 
shorter duration (a faster failure). Thus, we have a very flexible specification in which 
the shape of the hazard function, the probability of survival, and the time-to-failure can 
all vary from individual to individual.  
Finally, we also estimate a “standard” duration model (SDM) whose dependent 
variable is the length of time between the individual’s getting unemployed and its 
subsequent recall. For this purpose, we specify a log-logistic duration model, which 
assumes that ln(t) has a logistic distribution and yields the following functional forms on 
the survival and hazard functions: 
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where iXe 'βλ −= , and p is the scale parameter, which determines the shape of the 
distribution, is estimated from the data.  
 
Non-parametric analysis  
 
In this section we perform a non-parametric analysis based on life table 
estimation. This explanatory analysis will provide a first impression of what kind of 
profile the data exhibit. Duration is defined as staying in the original state (i.e., 
perceiving unemployment benefits) until a transition to employment occurs via recall or 
a new job. If none occurs during the time period of our analysis, the episode is 
considered as censored. Consequently, our definition of unemployment duration refers 
to the number of consecutive days being registered as receiving UI benefits. Plots of 
the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function for the sample which includes both 
recalled and non-recalled individuals, and for the sub-sample of recalled individuals 
only are presented in figure 1. The Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function 
using the full sample yields a survival function which reaches a limit at around 0.42. 
The Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function on the sub-sample who has been 
recalled show a much steeper descent and approaches zero for durations above 600 
days, showing that virtually every individual has been recalled by that time.  
[FIGURE 1] 
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The time profile of the empirical hazard (product limit estimates of the hazard 
function for the recall outcome) is presented in figure 2. The hazard rate of ending in a 
recall at a given moment of time is defined as the probability of being recalled at that 
moment, given that the benefit recipient has not been recalled previously. This Kaplan-
Meier hazard curve implies that the recall hazard rises steeply, reaches a maximum, 
and then gradually declines. Thus, it is evident its non-monotonicity; the recall hazard 
rises to a peak 120 days after the individual gets unemployed, then declines 
monotonically after that. This non-monotone shape suggests that a log-logistic or log-
normal specification provides a suitable fit for the data, as already commented in 
section 3.1 above.  
[FIGURE 2] 
 
In any case, if the incorrect distribution is chosen to model the unemployment 
hazard rate, the parameter estimates may be biased. In this regard, we have used 
several diagnostic tests for misspecification in our models. First, we check whether the 
predicted proportion of the recalled unemployed individuals obtained from the split 
duration model is close to the actual proportion observed in the data. Thirty six percent 
of the sample is eventually predicted to be recalled, which is very close to the 
proportion of recalled individuals observed in the dataset (33%). 
Second, we use plots of the cumulative Cox-Snell residuals for the observed 
failures in the sample to assess the general fit of the SDM and of the SPDM (for a 
general discussion of Cox-Snell residuals, see Klein and Moeschberger, 1997). This 
plot of residuals after fitting a parametric model to survival data is one of the most 
useful tools, and consists of comparing the distribution of the Cox-Snell residuals with 
the unit exponential distribution. A correctly fitted model should yield cumulative Cox-
Snell residuals which resemble a (censored) sample from a standard exponential 
distribution. A plot of this parametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function for 
these data should therefore lie on a 45º line through the origin. This comparison is 
made using a cumulative hazard, or log-cumulative hazard, plot of the residuals. In 
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summary, the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function of the Cox-Snell residuals 
—
)(ˆ CirS
— is obtained, and ( ))(ˆlog CirS−  is plotted against Cir . A straight line with unit 
slope and zero intercept should be obtained if the fitted model is appropriatex. The 
cumulative hazard plots of the Cox-Snell residuals are given in figures 3 and 4 —figure 
3 (4) plots the cumulative Cox-Snell residuals for the SDM (SPDM). In figure 3, 
comparing the lines, we observe what would be considered a concerning lack of fit. 
The deviation from the 45º line indicates some misspecification. On the contrary, figure 
4 shows that the line of the cumulative hazard has an intercept and slope close to zero 
and unity, respectively. Thus, the plot for the Cox-Snell residuals for the SPDM 
(calculated for the sub-sample of recalled individuals, see Figure 4) provides a 
substantial good fit (as expected).  
[FIGURES 3 AND 4] 
 
Estimation results 
Table 2 shows estimation results for both the SPDM described above and, for 
comparison, for the standard log-logistic duration model (SDM). The first three columns 
in this table give the parameter estimates for the SDM, and the next six columns 
present model estimates for the SPDM. As regards the latter model, the first set of 
coefficients relates to the recall duration and the second set of coefficients relates to 
the probability of ever being recalled. The SPDM, as already commented, weights the 
likelihood of each observation by using the estimated probability that the individuals will 
ever be recalled —although it is unknown a priori which people will eventually be 
recalled to the same employer, a logit function is estimated to describe the probability 
that any individual will do so—, whereas the traditional non-split duration model 
assumes that all of them will eventually do so. Parameters in both types of duration 
models are presented in terms of the “accelerated failure time” (AFT) parameterization. 
This parameterization presents coefficients in terms of their relationship to expected 
failure times. A negative sign on a coefficient under this parameterization implies that 
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the duration is “shortened” by some value per unit change in the covariate (i.e., the 
expected time-to-recall is sooner rather than later). Therefore, a negative coefficient 
implies an increase in the hazard rate, while a positively signed coefficient implies a 
decrease in the hazardxi. 
[TABLE 2] 
 
As regards estimation results from the SPDM, males are less likely to be 
recalled —being a male reduces the probability of a recall by 34 per cent—, and in 
case of being recalled, they are recalled later than women. In addition, although age is 
only an important determinant of whether a recall occurs for individuals above 44 
years-old (these individuals are the most likely recalled), in case that a recall occurs, 
age reduces the recall duration: individuals 24 years-old and older are recalled earlier 
than individuals under 24 years-old. This finding that younger workers are recalled later 
than elder workers is likely related to the fact that older workers enjoy more firm-
specific human capital, which is an attribute highly valued by the employer. Workers’ 
possession of human capital and its high cost of acquisition may therefore explain why 
firms are not interested in risking acquired human capital of eldest workers. In addition, 
it is a fact that younger workers are more willing to move from jobs (and employers) for 
improving their job match and eventually settling in a more stable career path (Jensen 
and Svarer, 2003). 
Although the data set does not contain variables related to the individual’s 
educational attainment or occupation, it does provide information related to the 
required level of qualification for the job (job category). The dummies collecting this 
information prove to be important determinants of both whether and when a recall to 
the previous employer is initiated. In particular, we find that highly White Collar High 
Skilled workers (WCHS) are recalled sooner by their previous employer than their 
remainder ones. This result, combined with that related to age and sex is qualitatively 
similar to those found in Alba et. al. (2007), and fit quite nicely into a variety of theories 
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suggesting that the accumulation of firm-specific human capital by older workers, the 
job-shopping behaviour of younger workers, and the level of qualifications are good 
explanatory factors of the probability of exiting from unemployment via a recall (Fischer 
and Pichelmann, 1991). 
As seasonal downturns in demand and production are easily anticipated by 
employers, they may turn to lay-off workers temporarily as an employment adjustment 
strategy. This expected relationship between seasonal work and recalls is captured 
through the variable contract in previous job. Holding a fixed-term contract in the 
previous job (temporary, casual contract, or other fixed-term contract) reduces the 
recall duration compared to those workers who were, instead, holding an open-ended 
contract. For workers with temporary or permanent-per-task contracts in their previous 
job, the estimated coefficient in the duration part of the SPDM is the most negative. 
These workers typically enjoy strong links with their previous employer when they are 
out of work. In addition, when being laid-off, those individuals receive payments 
subsidized by the Government through the UI system for the time not worked —see 
Alba et al. (2007) or Arranz and García-Serrano (2011a). 
As regards the income of the unemployed, our results show that the level of UI 
benefits becomes an important determinant of recall unemployment duration, under the 
SPDM estimation results. In particular, the higher the level of UI benefits, the shorter 
the recall duration is. This means that an individual with large UI benefit levels will 
expect recall, so that he may be willing to wait as long as the benefits lapse before 
searching for another job. That is, these individuals will likely be more selective 
concerning new job opportunities than those who are receiving a lower level of UI 
benefits (due to their recall expectation, the former are expected to be less likely to 
accept a job with a different employer). The risk that a firm loses laid-off workers to 
alternative employers will therefore be lower if they are receiving large UI benefits. An 
additional reason for this is the fact that other employers may be unwilling to incur the 
initial fixed cost of hiring and training workers who have a reasonable prospect of 
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recall. This situation might make a rotating system of layoffs attractive for employers 
during product demand downturns (see, e.g., Alba et al., 2012). 
As regards other variables that, apart from the UI benefit level, may affect 
unemployed individuals’ reservation wages, we find that net wages received in the last 
job have a significant effect on the length of time until a recall occurs. As can be 
observed in Table 2, unemployed individuals with higher (lower) net wages in the last 
job are recalled sooner (later) by their previous employer than the remainder onesxii. 
This finding is consistent with the above-mentioned effect associated with UI benefit 
levels, since those individuals with larger wages when employed will also be receiving 
larger UI benefits when unemployed. This result implies that these individuals will show 
a reduced new job search intensity induced by a larger perceived recall prospect.  
Apart from gender, age, job category and the previous type of contract, there 
are several other variables that provide interesting insights into the time until recall in 
Spain. One of these variables is firm size. Given the costs borne by workers in recalls 
—in terms of losses in current income, future benefit entitlements, employment security 
and human capital depreciation during lay-offs— workers’ councils (comités de 
empresa), which only exist in firms with at least 50 employees, are expected to 
minimize the duration of recalls effectively in larger firms (Alba et al., 2012).  As firm 
size increases, there will be more and stronger workers’ councils with both the power 
and the incentive to intervene and assist workers’ optimizing behaviour. In contrast, 
workers laid-off by smaller companies are expected to experience longer recall 
durations because they will be less able to influence the timing of such recalls. This 
expectation is confirmed in estimation results provided in table 2. Compared to firms 
with less than 10 employees, the recall duration of unemployed individuals who were 
previously employed in firms with more than 50 employees is around 38-39 per cent 
less. Therefore, duration until a recall occurs is reduced as firm size increases. Other 
relevant variable that provides interesting insights into the way workers exit 
unemployment through recall in Spain is their previous employment history. As can be 
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observed in table 2, unemployed workers with less than 6 months of tenure in their 
previous job are recalled sooner than the remainder individuals. This finding may 
reflect that fact that recalls are synchronized with the expiration of unemployment 
benefits, because laying off a worker with a high potential entitlement is less costly to 
the firm than laying off an equally productive worker with a low potential entitlement 
(Alba et al., 2012). Finally, compared to individuals in construction, individuals in the 
remaining industries —except for trade— are significantly more likely to be recalled, 
particularly those with previous experience in the health industry. 
As expected, there are relevant differences between the SPDM and the SDM 
estimates in table 2, both as regards their magnitude and significance. Some of the 
variables show undervalued estimated hazard rates in the traditional SDM. This is the 
case, for instance, of the individuals’ nationality: whereas under the SDM non-Spanish 
unemployed individuals remain unemployed before being recalled about 40 per cent 
longer than Spanish unemployed workers, under the SPDM estimates the former 
individuals survive 57 per cent longer than the latter. Differences between estimation 
results from both models are apparent when we analyze estimated coefficients for the 
variables collecting the type of contract and job category or skill jobs. Following SDM 
(SPDM) estimates, workers holding temporary or permanent per task contracts in their 
previous job are estimated to survive in unemployment 93 (42) per cent less than those 
holding open ended contracts. As can be observed, job category and industry variables 
are also highly sensible to the application of each of the econometric models. For 
example, while Blue Collar (high, medium and low skilled) workers are recalled sooner 
in the SDM, but they are recalled later in the SPDM. As regards industry variables, and 
following SPDM estimation results, UI recipients employed in trade are recalled later 
than those in construction (the former remain 25 per cent longer in unemployment 
before being recalled than the latter). In contrast, being employed in trade implies a 
shorter duration in unemployment until a recall occurs under the traditional SDM. In 
other industries as other services, personal services and housing, a negative significant 
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effect on the recall duration is obtained under the SDM, but no effect is evident under 
the SPDM estimation results. 
Finally, the estimated coefficient of the scaling parameter under the SDM is 
0.944 almost equal to 1xiii, which means that the probability of recall decreases with 
time. In contrast, the estimated coefficient of the scaling parameter obtained in the 
SPDM is 0.759 (below 1), which indicates that the probability of being recalled rises 
with time, but falls after t reaches some critical value (as can be observed in figure 6, 
see below). In particular, the recall hazard rises sharply in the first two months of 
unemployment and drops quickly after that. Therefore, benefit recipients are most at 
risk of being recalled when 45 days have passed after entering into insured 
unemployment. This was the main reason why the log-logistic form was chosen (this 
functional form allows for a maximum in the probability of being recalled, as suggested 
by the data). 
Further insights into differences between the SPDM and the SDM are illustrated 
in figures 5 and 6. These figures plot the estimated mean hazard and survival 
functions, respectively, for each of the models. Figure 5 plots the predicted survival 
function from the standard duration model (SDM) and the split population duration 
model (SPDM). The SDM survival estimates begin and remain high, and decline only 
very slowly. Moreover, although in figure 5 the log-logistic predicted survival function 
for the SDM should eventually reach 0 (implying that all individuals in the sample will 
eventually be recalled), the function does not reach 0, which confirms that the model is 
misspecified (as already commented above). On the contrary, the estimated survival 
function in the SPDM declines rapidly. Thus, while the SDM estimates a 0.48 
probability of an individual remaining unemployed beyond one year, the corresponding 
probability for the SPDM is only 0.19. Bear in mind, however, that this estimate is 
conditional on the individual being recalled, itself a separate issue in the model 
presented here. 
[FIGURE 5] 
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Figure 6 illustrates that the estimated hazard for the SDM is excessively low 
and exhibits little variation over time, as compared to that from the SPDM. Moreover, 
the predicted hazard function for the SPDM fits the shape of the Kaplan-Meier 
estimates shown in figure 1 reasonably well — the recall hazard rises to a peak around 
41 days after the individuals’ getting unemployed, and then declines monotonically 
after that. In contrast, the estimated hazard for the standard duration model displays no 
such non-monotonicity property: the predicted hazard function for the SDM is rather 
monotonic and does not show the typical peak during the first days of the 
unemployment spell.  
[FIGURE 6] 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we analyze the driving forces behind the duration pattern of recall 
unemployment spells in Spain, under the framework of duration models. Specifically, 
we examine the factors that determine unemployment benefit recipients’ duration in UI 
until a recall occurs, using an administrative dataset from the Spanish MCVL for the 
period 2005-2010. Our focus is placed, therefore, on the length of time until a recall 
occurs. The standard assumption in duration models that every individual will 
eventually exit from unemployment (i.e., that the probability of survival will become zero 
as time goes to infinity), is not appropriate because a substantial proportion of benefit 
recipients in our sample does not leave unemployment to return to the same employer. 
One approach that takes into account the never-recall possibility is the split population 
model proposed by Schmidt and Witte (1989). Following their approach, we include in 
the likelihood function a term representing the probability of eventual recall and define 
the hazard function conditional on eventual leaving. In particular, we estimate two 
models based on two competing assumptions: the first model takes the standard 
assumption in duration models that all recipients are eventually recalled to their 
previous employer. The second one consists of a split-population model which takes 
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into account the possibility that there are some recipients who will never exit 
unemployment to a recall job. This model allows us to examine the variables that affect 
the propensity and timing of recall jobs, given that only a proportion of benefit recipients 
ends their unemployment spell in a recall job. 
One of the objectives in estimating the split population model for recalls as an 
alternative to the standard duration model is to examine how estimation results change 
when the standard assumption on duration models is relaxed and to analyze which 
individual characteristics are significantly associated with the recall hazard rate. In 
determining the length of time prior to the recall outcome, controlling the probability of 
never being recalled becomes critical in analyzing exit from unemployment via recalls 
in Spain, because there are important differences in estimation results when the 
standard assumption on duration models is relaxed. In particular, one important 
difference between both models relies not so much in the significance of the 
explanatory variables, but in the magnitude of the estimated hazard rates. For instance, 
according to the traditional duration model, BCHS, BCMS and BCLS workers are 
recalled earlier than the WCHS ones. However, results in the SPDM show that those 
individuals are indeed recalled later than WCHS workers. Hence, once the probability 
of eventual recall is controlled for, some variables change their estimated signs in the 
recall hazard function of the split population duration model.  In general, the variables 
that make individuals more likely recalled by their previous employers show 
undervalued estimated coefficients in the standard duration model. For instance, 
individuals working in firms with above 250 employees stay unemployed under UI 
benefits in the standard duration model (split population model) for a period which is 49 
(38) per cent shorter than individuals working in other types of firms. 
There are four main conclusions deriving from our analysis. First, estimation 
results on age and individual’s qualification show that the accumulation of firm-specific 
human capital by older workers may serve as an explanation for the observed 
differences in age-specific transition patterns. The job-shopping behaviour of younger 
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workers and the level of qualifications reveal as good explanatory factors of the 
probability of escaping UI for recalled workers. Therefore, employers tend not to rehire 
persons with insufficient firm-specific human capital, given its high cost of acquisition in 
the open market. Second, the type of contract the unemployed individual held in his/her 
previous job presents a very strong association with duration until recall: individuals 
who entered UI from a job with a temporary or permanent-per-task contract have 
significantly shorter recall duration. As seasonal downturns in demand and production 
are easily anticipated by employers, this result indicates that they may turn to lay-off 
workers temporarily as an employment adjustment strategy. Third, the fact that recall 
duration is shorter the larger the level of UI benefits and the larger the wages received 
in the previous job suggests that UI is of benefit to the firm because reducing the 
intensity with which temporarily laid-off workers look for new jobs helps to keep them 
permanently attached to the firm: the risk of losing training investments the firm has 
made in these individuals, particularly those with larger levels of specific human capital 
(which is typically associated with larger wages and UI benefit levels) is, therefore, 
reduced. Finally, the finding that unemployed workers with less than 6 months of tenure 
in their previous job are recalled sooner than the remainder individuals, suggests the UI 
system may be enlarging the incidence of temporary layoff unemployment. In 
particular, because laying off a worker with a high potential entitlement is less costly to 
the firm than laying off an equally productive worker with a low potential entitlement, 
recalls may be synchronized with the expiration of unemployment benefits, particularly 
of those individuals with shorter entitlement periods. The risk that the employer loses 
laid-off workers to alternative employers with longer entitlement periods who expect 
recall is clearly lower. Hence, for individuals with short entitlement periods, the 
construction of the UI-benefit system may make it possible to work just enough to 
qualify for new periods of benefit and be unemployed during the rest of the year. This 
may be an important source of temporary layoffs.  
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In essence, our study has re-examined and extended previous work on 
unemployment duration and recalls in the Spanish context. As we have seen, the fact 
that the majority of UI benefit recipients are not essentially subject to high recall 
likelihood has important implications for modelling the incidence of those recalls.  Our 
study points out the potential usefulness of split-population models to researchers 
studying unemployment duration data more generally. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of UI benefit recipients by destination states 
 CENSORED NEW JOB RECALL JOB 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
Gender 
      
  Men 0.483 0.500 0.624 0.484 0.444 0.497 
Age groups 
      
  <24 years 0.068 0.252 0.115 0.319 0.057 0.232 
  24-29 years 0.215 0.411 0.286 0.452 0.203 0.403 
  30-44 years  0.483 0.500 0.446 0.497 0.504 0.500 
  >44 years 0.234 0.424 0.154 0.360 0.235 0.424 
Nationality (Non-Spanish) 0.095 0.293 0.081 0.272 0.055 0.228 
Job Category 
      
WCHS 0.047 0.211 0.046 0.209 0.105 0.306 
WCMS 0.039 0.192 0.042 0.201 0.035 0.184 
WCLS 0.254 0.435 0.245 0.430 0.228 0.419 
BCHS 0.231 0.422 0.268 0.443 0.230 0.421 
BCMS 0.183 0.387 0.170 0.375 0.168 0.374 
BCLS 0.247 0.431 0.230 0.421 0.234 0.423 
Industry 
      
  Manufact. and energy 0.168 0.374 0.164 0.370 0.146 0.353 
  Construction  0.117 0.321 0.154 0.361 0.079 0.270 
  Trade 0.177 0.382 0.165 0.371 0.075 0.264 
  Hotels and restaurants 0.138 0.345 0.105 0.307 0.150 0.357 
  Transport 0.051 0.221 0.062 0.241 0.065 0.246 
  Business activi ies, 
financial intermediation, real 
state and renting 0.227 0.419 0.247 0.431 0.211 0.408 
  Education 0.029 0.167 0.022 0.146 0.058 0.234 
  Health 0.042 0.202 0.039 0.193 0.176 0.380 
  Other services, personal 
services and housing 0.050 0.217 0.042 0.200 0.040 0.197 
Firm size 
      
  0 0.354 0.478 0.399 0.490 0.252 0.434 
  1-9 workers  0.211 0.408 0.187 0.390 0.125 0.331 
  10-19 workers 0.080 0.271 0.078 0.267 0.064 0.244 
  20-49 workers 0.100 0.300 0.095 0.294 0.090 0.287 
  50-249 workers 0.136 0.342 0.128 0.334 0.180 0.384 
  250+ workers 0.120 0.325 0.112 0.316 0.289 0.453 
Contract in previous job 
      
  Open-ended   0.270 0.444 0.203 0.402 0.020 0.140 
  Temporary & permanent  
per-task 0.352 0.477 0.393 0.488 0.518 0.500 
  Casual 0.315 0.465 0.340 0.474 0.229 0.420 
  Other fixed-term 0.063 0.244 0.065 0.246 0.233 0.423 
Tenure in previous job 
      
  < 6 months  0.456 0.498 0.525 0.499 0.617 0.486 
  ≥6 months and <1 year 0.204 0.403 0.196 0.397 0.295 0.456 
  ≥1 year and <3 years 0.225 0.417 0.199 0.399 0.075 0.264 
  ≥3 years  0.116 0.320 0.081 0.273 0.012 0.109 
UI level (€/day) 21.912 58.005 24.439 17.924 25.679 10.997 
Wages (€/day) 54.405 148 210 47.508 59.551 50.883 131.402 
Sample 6,855 26,291 16,994 
Sample (weighted) 171,375 657,275 424,850 
Source: Spain: MCVL 2005-2010.  
Notes: ‘Job category’ is classified as: White-collar high-skilled occupations, WCHS (managers, workers with university degree, technical 
engineers and qualified assistants); White-collar medium-skilled occupa ions, WCMS (clerical and workshop heads and assistants); White-
collar low-skilled occupations, WCLS (administrative officials and other clerical workers); Blue-collar high-skilled occupations, BCHS (first and 
second class officials); Blue-collar medium-skilled occupations, BCMS ( hird class officials and specialists); and Blue-collar low-skilled 
occupa ions, BCLS (labourers). 
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Table 2. Standard and split population duration model estimates 
 STANDARD LOG-LOGISTIC SPLIT-POPULATION LOG-LOGISTIC-LOGIT 
 LOG-LOGISTIC DURATION LOG-LOGISTIC DURATION LOGIT 
 Coef. Std. dev. T-ratio Coef. Std. dev. T-ratio Coef. Std. dev. T-ratio 
Gender 
         
  Men 0.319 0.024 *** 0.185 0.027 *** -0.422 0.055 *** 
  Women  
- - - - - - - - - 
Age groups 
         
  <24 years 
- - - - - - - - - 
  24-29 years 
-0.158 0.043 *** -0.176 0.063 *** -0.059 0.124  
  30-44 years  
-0.571 0.041 *** -0.554 0.060 *** 0.052 0.119  
  >44 years 
-0.684 0.043 *** -0.582 0.062 *** 0.305 0.125 *** 
Nationality (Non-Spanish) 0.334 0.040 *** 0.451 0.053 *** 0.147 0.115  
Job category 
         
WCHS 
- - - - - - - - - 
WCMS 0.244 0.065 *** 0.411 0.072 *** 0.496 0.160 *** 
WCLS 0.151 0.045 *** 0.130 0.049 *** 0.154 0.116  
BCHS 
-0.162 0.050 *** 0.236 0.058 *** 1.107 0.133 *** 
BCMS 
-0.167 0.051 *** 0.130 0.058 ** 0.926 0.135 *** 
BCLS 
-0.126 0.051 ** 0.181 0.058 *** 0.924 0.132 *** 
Industry 
         
  Manufact. and energy 
-0.691 0.042 *** -0.274 0.056 *** 0.746 0.094 *** 
  Construction  
- - - - - - - - - 
  Trade 
-0.147 0.049 *** 0.221 0.066 *** 0.649 0.117 *** 
  Hotels and restaurants 
-0.732 0.044 *** -0.123 0.059 ** 1.359 0.119 *** 
  Transport 
-0.989 0.053 *** -0.456 0.075 *** 1.129 0.140 *** 
  Business activities, financial intermediation, real 
state and renting -0.515 0.039 *** -0.381 0.054 *** 0.318 0.085 *** 
  Education 
-0.768 0.063 *** -0.187 0.076 *** 1.561 0.183 *** 
  Health 
-1.708 0.056 *** -1.088 0.082 *** 1.407 0.202 *** 
  Other services, personal services and housing 
-0.615 0.059 *** 0.018 0.077  1.466 0.179 *** 
Firm size 
         
  0 
-0.084 0.032 *** -0.321 0.041 *** -0.438 0.082 *** 
  1-9 workers  
- - - - - - - - - 
  10-19 workers 
-0.221 0.045 *** -0.241 0.057 *** -0.019 0.118  
  20-49 workers 
-0.316 0.041 *** -0.459 0.050 *** -0.291 0.101 *** 
  50-249 workers 
-0.509 0.035 *** -0.499 0.043 *** 0.118 0.092  
  250+ workers 
-0.675 0.036 *** -0.474 0.044 *** 0.729 0.102 *** 
Contract in previous job 
         
  Open-ended  
- - - - - - - - - 
  Temporary & permanent per-task 
-2.648 0.065 *** -0.552 0.115 0 000 2.958 0.133 *** 
  Casual 
-1.921 0.066 *** -0.166 0.117 0.158 2.264 0.137 *** 
  Other fixed-term 
-2.718 0.071 *** -0.274 0.126 0 030 4.025 0.249 *** 
Tenure in previous job 
         
  < 6 months  
- - - - - - - - - 
  ≥6 months and <1 year 0.104 0.024 *** 0.518 0.033 *** 0.946 0.084 *** 
  ≥1 year and <3 years 1.039 0.035 *** 1.430 0.054 *** 0.732 0.135 *** 
  ≥3 years  1.392 0.085 *** 1.109 0.148 *** -0.230 0.185  
Log( UI level) -0.620 0.032 *** -0.392 0.035 *** 0.427 0.065 *** 
Log(wages) -0.275 0.027 *** -0.475 0.036 *** -0.203 0.059 *** 
Constant 6.935 0.149 *** 3.573 0.194 *** -3.938 0.347 *** 
Shape Parameter: p  0.944 0.006 *** 0.759 0.007 ***    
Observations 50,140 50,140 
Log-likelihood -45458.15   -28067.301 
Notes: N=50,140 (16,994 recall observa ions). Predicted eventual recall rate for split population model = 0.3639. We have also included 
dummy variables for each quarter of exit. 
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Figure 1. Survival functions. All sample and recall sub-sample 
 
Figure 2. Kaplan Meier Recall hazard function. All sample 
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Figure 3. Cumulative Cox-Snell residuals: standard duration model (SDM)  
 
Figure 4. Cumulative Cox-Snell residuals: split-population model (SPDM) 
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Figure 5. Standard (SDM) and split-population (SPDM) survival estimates 
 
Figure 6. Standard (SDM) and Split-population (SPDM) hazard estimates. 
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i
 Another notable characteristic of the UCS in Spain, as in other European countries, is the availability of 
UA for individuals in the following situations: (1) did not meet the minimum contribution period for eligibility; 
(2) exhausted UI and has family dependents; (3) returned from foreign migration; (4) was released from 
prison; (5) an invalidity spell ended by the labour authority declaring the worker able to take a job; (6) aged 
52 or older. In this paper, we only focus on UI recipients. 
ii
 It should be stressed that recall is always just a possibility and never a certainty. Unfortunately, we only 
refer to temporary lay-offs in an ex post sense—i.e., job separations ending in recall. We have no 
information on ex ante temporary lay-offs—i.e., those that begin with a person expecting to be recalled. In 
any case, this ex post concept gives the proportion of unemployment from spells involving no job change 
(Feldstein, 1975; Clark and Summers, 1979), and it is not ambiguous in the sense that it is not based on 
whether individuals decide on what is a new employer and what is not (see Alba et al., 2007).  
iii
 It is noteworthy that we have no information on ex ante temporary layoffs— i.e., those that begin with an 
individual expecting to be recalled and we only refer to temporary layoffs in an ex post sense —i.e., job 
separations ending in recall.  
iv
 Although this dataset does not include information on the entitlement period, it includes information on 
the previous employment duration, which can be considered as a proxy variable of entitlement duration. 
v
 The ‘tax module’ in the MCVL provided by the Tax Administration National Agency (Agencia Tributaria, 
AEAT) gives annual data on different types of incomes: wages and salaries; pensions; unemployment 
benefits (in the event a worker is separated from a job and eligible for them); income from economic 
activities; and others. 
vi
 One of the main advantages of the MCVL dataset is that the information contained in the personal, 
contribution and tax files can be matched thanks to the existence of a unique identification number for 
each person and employer. Nevertheless, this procedure is not easy. Arranz and García-Serrano (2011b) 
describe the procedure to compute daily wages and level of benefit from the tax module from the MCVL. 
vii
 This model is identified even when the variables in this logit or probit model are identical to those in the 
model of duration. This means that one can test for the effects of the same set of variables on both the 
incidence of failure and the duration associated with it (Schmidt and Witte, 1989). 
viii
 Since time dependence in the log-logistic duration model is captured by the estimates of p and λ, in our 
estimations we omit dummies to capture time dependence from the duration part of the model. 
ix
 The parameters can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation procedures in Stata. The 
programming code used to implement the SPD was created by Foster and Jones (2001) using the "ml 
max" command in Stata. 
x
 In the log-logistic model, the standardized residuals should behave as a sample from a logistic 
distribution, if the fitted model is correct. Equivalently, the Cox-Snell residuals for the log-logistic 
accelerated failure time model are given by: ( )[ ]SiCi rr exp1log +−= , where Sir  is the i-th 
standardized residual. This standardized residual is obtained from: pXtrs ˆˆ)ln( β−= , where p is 
the scale parameter estimated in the model. 
xi
 Regression coefficients obtained in the SPDM are interpreted as in traditional logit and survival analyses: 
when exponentiated, the logit coefficients are interpretable as odds ratios and the survival analysis 
coefficients as hazard ratios. In AFT models, a one unit increase in X leads to a β increase in the logged 
survival time. An alternative interpretation is that actual survival times increase at a rate of β or by 100 β 
per cent with a unit increase in X. We can also look at the percentage change in the survival time 
associated with a change in the value of some covariate, X, by some amount δ: Percentage change= 100 
(exp(β*δ)-1). If δ is just one unit, we say that one unit increase in X increases the survival time by (exp(β)-
1)*100 percent. 
xii
 In previous versions of this paper a replacement rate variable was included in the estimations (this 
variable was calculated by dividing the level of UI benefits during the unemployment period by the 
individual’s net wage in his/her last job). Results showed that the replacement rate did not significantly 
affect recall unemployment duration. 
xiii
 Recall that the scaling parameter estimated in the log-logistic model provides us with information about 
the shape of the hazard function. If p<1, the log-logistic hazard increases and then decreases. If p≥1, the 
hazard is monotone decreasing. 
